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Trustful and trustworthy behaviors have important externalities for the society. But what
exactly drives people to behave in a trustful and trustworthy manner? Building on
research suggesting that individuals’ social preferences might be a common factor
informing both behaviors, we study the impact of a set of different motives on
individuals’ choices in a dual-role Trust Game (TG). We employ data from a large-scale
representative experiment (N = 774), where all subjects played both roles of a binary
TG with real monetary incentives. Subjects’ social motives were inferred using their
decisions in a Dictator Game and a dual-role Ultimatum Game. Next to self-interest
and strategic motives we consider preferences for altruism, spitefulness, egalitarianism,
and efficiency. We demonstrate that there exists considerable heterogeneity in motives
in the TG. Most importantly, among individuals who choose to trust as trustors, social
motives can differ dramatically as there is a non-negligible proportion of them who
seem to act out of (strategic) self-interest whereas others are driven more by efficiency
considerations. Subjects’ elicited trustworthiness, however, can be used to infer such
motivations: while the former are not trustworthy as trustees, the latter are. We discuss
that research on trust can benefit from adding the second player’s choice in TG designs.
Keywords: Trust Game, dictator game, ultimatum game, social preferences, self-interest
INTRODUCTION
Trustful and trustworthy individuals constitute an asset for their societies. Evidence documenting
positive associations between general interpersonal trust levels or perceived trustworthiness and
important country indicators such as economic prosperity, social equality, health, and happiness
abounds (Kawachi et al., 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Guiso et al., 2006, 2008; Oishi et al., 2011).
But what exactly motivates individuals to act in a trustful and a trustworthy manner?
For many years and across disciplines, the consensus has been that trust is a form of
encapsulated self-interest; an expression of a calculated risky decision based on the individual’s
expectations regarding others’ trustworthiness. Similarly, trustworthiness has been considered a
form of reciprocity with the purpose of maintaining mutually beneficial relationships (Rotter, 1980;
Barber, 1983; Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 2002).
The development of experimental games, and in particular of the Trust Game (TG; Berg et al.,
1995), allowed a more systematic study of the underlying motives of trusting and trustworthy
behavior. In the TG, a first player (the trustor) has the option to send an amount of money to
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a second player (the trustee). Whatever amount the trustor
decides to send is multiplied by a factor (normally between
2 and 4) before reaching the trustee. Then, the trustee can
send part of this money back to the trustor. The decision
of the trustor measures trust, while that of the trustee
measures trustworthiness. This research agenda has produced
some consistent findings and demonstarted that both trust
and trustworthiness are multi-dimensional concepts, not always
guided by self-regarding considerations.
First of all, it is clear that not all individuals who trust in
the TG base their decision on positive expectations of others’
trustworthiness. 1In fact, it has been shown that more than
half of the trusting trustors believe that they will not make
any profit out of trusting (Ashraf et al., 2006; Fetchenhauer
and Dunning, 2009; Dunning et al., 2014). Even after they are
explicitly informed that trusting is not the profit-maximizing
option, most individuals keep choosing to trust, which is at odds
with their private monetary interest (Berg et al., 1995; Ortmann
et al., 2000).
Equally robust is the finding that differences in risk
preferences cannot fully account for differences in trusting
behavior. In fact, the two are rarely correlated (Eckel and Wilson,
2004; Ashraf et al., 2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Ben-Ner
and Halldorsson, 2010; Houser et al., 2010; Etang et al., 2011;
Corgnet et al., 2015b). What is more, when presented with both
a TG and a lottery designed to mimic the return and risk level
of the TG, some individuals choose to trust in the TG but not
the risky option in the lottery (Fetchenhauer and Dunning, 2009;
Dunning et al., 2012). However, the opposite often happens as
well, which has been traced back to “betrayal aversion” (Bohnet
and Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008; Corcos et al., 2012;
Fairley et al., 2014). The above suggests that the decision to trust
is something more or at least something different than simply a
risky investment.
Scholars have early on tested whether these deviations from
the “risky-investment” model can be explained, at least partially,
by the trustors’ social preferences. Indeed, individuals who are
generous in a Triadic Dictator Game – a game identical with
the TG, but with the option of the trustee removed – are
also more trustful in the TG (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000;
Cox, 2004). Likewise, individuals with prosocial Social Value
Orientations (SVO)2 are more trusting compared to proself
individuals (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Derks et al., 2014).
Based on these results, individuals’ unconditional kindness or
prosociality has been suggested as a factor prompting them to act
in a trustful manner. However, unconditional kindness is a rather
ambiguous term through the lens of social preferences and in
fact a wide range of motives can explain generous, kind behavior
(Charness and Rabin, 2002; Corgnet et al., 2015a).
1Note here that we use a parsimonious definition of trust as a behavior (Coleman,
1994). Such a behavioral definition leaves the reasons underlying trust open.
2The SVO (Messick and McClintock, 1968; Van Lange et al., 1997) measures an
individual’s preferences over monetary allocations between his/herself and another
unknown individual. Measuring the SVO involves the individual making a number
of (typically six or nine) distributional choices. Based on the these choices, the
individual is classified as prosocial, individualist or competitor, with the latter two
often collapsed into the proself category.
Interestingly, unconditional kindness has been suggested
to motivate the decisions of many trustees as well. While
studies generally confirm the “traditional” reciprocity account of
trustworthiness – reporting a positive slope between the amount
sent by trustors and the amount returned by trustees (Güth et al.,
2000; Schotter and Sopher, 2006; Bellemare and Kröger, 2007;
Bornhorst et al., 2010) – trustees’ trustworthy behavior is in
fact also predicted by their own behavior in a standard Dictator
Game (Forsythe et al., 1994). In other words, kind individuals –
those who are generous in a Dictator Game – also appear to
be trustworthy in the TG (Ashraf et al., 2006; Chaudhuri and
Gangadharan, 2007; Kovacs and Willinger, 2013). Note here
again that generous offers in the Dictator Game can be triggered
by either altruistic or egalitarian motives (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Staffiero et al., 2013). Additionally, antisocial motives such
as spitefulness can lead to seemingly selfish, zero offers (Brañas-
Garza et al., 2014), that is, to a lack of kindness.
Last but not least, the most trusting individuals are usually
also the most trustworthy ones (or vice versa). That is, when
individuals play both roles in the TG, their two decisions
are highly correlated (Glaeser et al., 2000; Chaudhuri and
Gangadharan, 2007; Altmann et al., 2008; Kovacs and Willinger,
2013). This evidence has been taken to suggest that there is
probably a common factor informing both decisions. Combining
this finding with the above arguments, such common factor
might partly be related to individuals’ distributional (or outcome-
based) social preferences, that is, their preferences over mere
payoff distributions. Indeed in real-life social relationships,
individuals typically act as both trustors and trustees when
interacting with each other. It is thus plausible that people treat
both roles as the two sides of a single strategy: how to act in social
exchange relations.
Summarizing so far, the literature provides clear evidence that
trust cannot be understood by beliefs and risk preferences alone,
and that social preferences play an important role in both trusting
and trustworthy behavior in TG. The literature nevertheless has
not explicitly studied the particular social preferences that may
account for TG strategies across roles, often silently assuming
unconditional kindess or prosociality in general.
Theoretical advances on social preferences, however, have
identified and formally defined a large array of motives that
are widespread across individuals (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Van
Lange et al., 2013). This paper takes a closer look on the kind of
social preferences that may lead to different strategies in the TG.
We focus on those social preferences that may rationalize trusting
and trustworthy behavior from an outcome-based viewpoint.
In particular, we consider preferences for altruism, spitefulness,
egalitarianism, and efficiency. To these, we add narrow self-
interest (or “selfishness”) and strategic self-interest as possible
behavioral drivers.
Social Motives in the Trust Game
Altruism refers to a positive concern for others’ payoffs (Andreoni
and Miller, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Altruism may
lead individuals to both trust and be trustworthy in the TG
because such choices increase the payoff of their counterpart.
But it is also true that increasing the payoff of the trustee
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can come at a disproportionately high (expected) cost for the
trustor if the former is expected to return a low amount of
money. Beliefs can therefore be important for an altruist’s
decision to trust. In fact, while there is evidence that suggests a
positive effect of altruism on trustworthiness (Ashraf et al., 2006;
Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2007; Kovacs and Willinger, 2013),
previous results regarding its impact on trust are less consistent
(Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Cox, 2004; Brülhart and Usunier,
2012).
Spitefulness (Kirchsteiger, 1994; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006), on
the dark side of social preferences, refers to a negative concern for
others’ payoffs. Spitefulness may drive individuals to be untrustful
and untrustworthy in the TG, in a analogous way that altruism
drives them in the opposite direction: not trusting and not being
trustworthy will result in minimizing the counterpart’s payoff and
thus in the highest relative standing for the decision maker (Fehr
et al., 2008).
Egalitarianism or aversion to inequality (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Van Lange, 1999) may lead individuals to be trustworthy
in the TG because such choice is usually associated with
an egalitarian outcome (Ciriolo, 2007; Corgnet et al., 2015b).
The impact of inequality aversion on trusting behavior is
more ambiguous, however. On the one hand, such an impact
would depend on the trustor’s expectations about the trustee’s
trustworthiness. On the other hand, it also depends on the initial
endowments of the players. If the two players start the game with
identical amounts of money (as in Berg et al., 1995), trusting
would lead to a more unequal outcome than not trusting for
any realistic expectations of trustworthiness – except when the
trustor believes that every trustee will return exactly half of the
money generated in the exchange – so that an egalitarian trustor
should not necessarily pass the money. If the trustor starts with
more money than the trustee (as it happens in many variants
of the original TG, such as in that developed by Ermisch and
Gambetta, 2006), then the expected trustworthiness is crucial
to guide the behavior of an egalitarian trustor. Indeed, previous
results have failed to find a clear effect of inequality aversion on
trusting behavior (e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Bohnet
and Zeckhauser, 2004; Cox, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008; Brülhart
and Usunier, 2012; Corgnet et al., 2015b).
Efficiency concerns or a preference for maximizing the total
surplus (Van Lange, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002), may
prompt individuals to trust in the TG since the pie is getting
bigger as the trustor chooses to trust (see Bolton and Ockenfels,
2010). In principle, assuming that utilities are approximately
linear over the relevant range of payoffs, as it is the typical
assumption when dealing with experimental data (e.g., Fehr
and Schmidt, 2006), a preference for efficiency should not
motivate trustees’ choices since they cannot affect the total
surplus.
Finally, self-interest can be driving choices in both roles of
the TG. Trustors who are narrowly selfish in the sense that they
believe that the trustee is selfish as well (so that she will not
return any money, as the traditional self-interest model predicts)
should not trust. On the other hand, strategic considerations
could lead self-interested trustors to trust provided that they
expect trustees to return at least some minimum amount. In the
case of trustees, both narrow and strategic self-interest will dictate
to return nothing.
We report data from a citywide survey-experiment where all
participants in the sample (N = 774, after excluding incomplete
observations) played a binary version of the Trust Game
(Figure 1A), both as trustors and as trustees. Following the
previous arguments regarding the dual-role nature of social
relations, individuals were classified into one of four groups, each
corresponding to a single strategy profile (see Figure 1B): (YY)
Trustful & Trustworthy (56.72% of the sample), (YN) Trustful
& Not Trustworthy (13.95%), (NY) Not Trustful & Trustworthy
(14.47%), and (NN) Not Trustful & Not Trustworthy (14.86%).
The participants also played a Dictator Game (DG) and an
Ultimatum Game (UG; Güth et al., 1982). Based on these
decisions, we were able to explore the social motives associated
with each TG strategy. For our analysis, we start from the
assumption that most people are consistent in their social
preferences across games, which has been supported by recent
empirical evidence (Yamagishi et al., 2013; Carlsson et al.,
2014; Peysakhovich et al., 2014). However, we must note that
individuals may switch strategies across games for instance as
a result of moral licensing, a possibility that we cannot exclude
(Monin and Miller, 2001; Dunning, 2007; Brañas-Garza et al.,
2013; but see Gneezy et al., 2012, who find that licensing is less
of an issue when social/moral decisions are “costly,” as it is the
case in our design).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics statement
All participants were informed about the content of the study
prior to participating. Identical instructions were read aloud
by the interviewers. Since literacy was not a requirement
to participate (this was necessary to obtain a representative
sample), we could not ask participants to read and sign the IC.
Oral informed consent was obtained from all the participants
included in this paper. Only those who accepted were allowed
to participate. Anonymity was always preserved (in compliance
with Spanish Law 15/1999 on Personal Data Protection) by
randomly assigning a numerical code to identify the participants
in the system. No association was ever made between their
real names/addresses and the results. As is standard in socio-
economic experiments, no ethical concerns are involved other
than preserving the anonymity of the participants. No deception
was used. This procedure (including the consent process) was
checked and approved by the Vice-dean of Research of the
School of Economics of the University of Granada; the institution
hosting the experiments. At that time, there was no official IRB
committee at the School of Economics.
Design and Protocol
The survey-experiment took place in Granada (Spain) during
the months of November and December 2010. A stratified
sample of the city’s adult population (age ≥ 16) was recruited
resulting in a total of 835 individuals. Participants completed
the survey-experiment at their households upon agreement of
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FIGURE 1 | Trust Game Strategies. (A) Describes the binary Trust Game while (B) depicts the classification of the strategies (number of subjects in each group in
parentheses).
participation in the presence of two monitors (there were a
total of 108 pairs of interviewers). The resulting sample was
representative of the city’s population both geographically and
in terms of key demographic characteristics (see Appendix Table
A1 and the supplementary information in Exadaktylos et al.
(2013) for further details). One out every 10 participants was
randomly selected to get paid. Average earnings among the
selected participants were €9.60.
In the first part, a rich set of demographic and socio-economic
information was collected. In the second part, participants
played three experimental games, summing up to a total of five
experimental decisions: a Trust Game (both roles), a Dictator
Game (both roles, but one is passive), and an Ultimatum Game
(both roles). For each decision, participants were randomly
matched with a different anonymous participant. To control for
possible order or spillover effects, the order both between and
within games was randomized across participants, resulting in
24 different orders (always setting aside the two decisions of
the same game). A double-blind procedure was implemented
by having respondents privately marking their decisions on a
response card and subsequently placing it into an envelope.
Matching and payment took place a few days later. All
procedures were common knowledge. See Appendix for more
details.
Binary Trust Game
For the measurement of trust and trustworthy behavior, a binary
version of the TG developed by Ermisch and Gambetta (2006)
was employed (see Figure 1A). In this version of the game, a first
player, the trustor, is endowed with €10 and has to decide between
(1) keeping the whole amount for herself (i.e., being not trustful)
and (2) transferring the whole amount to the second player, the
trustee (i.e., being trustful). In the former case, the game ends
and the trustee gets a zero payoff. In the latter case, the €10
is being quadrupled, and consequently the trustee receives €40.
Then the trustee has to decide between (1) keeping the whole €40
for herself (i.e., being not trustworthy), leaving the trustor with
a zero payoff and (2) giving back €22 to the trustor and keeping
€18 for herself (i.e., being trustworthy). All participants made a
decision for both roles; for the trustee’s decision they reported
what they would choose in case the trustor decided to pass the
€10.
This version of the game is designed in a way that facilitates
its application outside the lab, embedded in surveys (for a
detailed description, see (Ermisch and Gambetta, 2006) and for
an application see Ermisch et al., 2009). Importantly, it allows
identifying trust and trustworthiness behavior in a simple and
rigorous way. In particular, this design is well suited for the
purposes of the present study, since it makes possible to build a
two-by-two categorization as shown in Figure 1B.
Constructing the Behavioral Motive
Profiles
The behavioral motive profiles were constructed using
participants’ decisions on the DG and the UG. In particular, in
both games participants had to split a €20 pie between themselves
and another anonymous participant. They decided which part
of the €20 (in €2 increments), if any, they wanted to transfer to
the other participant. In the case of the UG, implementation
was upon acceptance of the proposer’s offer by the randomly
matched responder; in case of rejection neither participant
earned anything. For the role of the responder in the UG the
strategy method was employed (Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993), in
which subjects had to state their willingness to accept or reject
each possible proposal beforehand. Based on these decisions, we
calculated the Minimum Acceptable Offer (MAO) as responder
of each participant.
Descriptive statistics for each of the three DG/UG raw
behavioral measures can be found in Appendix Table A1, and the
full distribution of choices is displayed in Appendix Figure A1.
It can be seen that the equal split (€10) was the modal response
in the three roles considered, whereas mean values were 39%
of the pie (€7.86) for DG offer, 47% (€9.31) for UG offer and
35% (€6.99) for UG MAO. These behavioral patterns are similar
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to those observed in other representative and field studies (e.g.,
Bellemare and Kröger, 2007; Henrich et al., 2010).
As is the case with the TG, different motives may underlie
individuals’ choices in these two games as well (see Staffiero
et al., 2013; Yamagishi et al., 2013, 2014; Brañas-Garza et al.,
2014; Peysakhovich et al., 2014; Espín et al., 2015). Based on the
potential multiplicity of motives, we built a number of variables
aimed at proxying how concerned an individual is regarding each
motive (see Table 1). In particular, using subjects’ behavior in the
DG and the UG, we defined six dummy variables to be used in
explaining TG choices. Note that these variables are not based
on incontestable or even mutually exclusive definitions (although
sometimes this is the case; see Section “Statistical Analysis”), nor
are they intended to be used to infer aggregate levels of such
motives in the population. Also, we do not claim that individuals
are concerned with just one single motive since, within subjects,
multiple motives might be at play at the same time. Rather, these
proxies are to be understood as simple empirical tools that may
nonetheless be very helpful in uncovering the motives that are
relatively more likely to be driving one, compared to another
specific choice in the TG.
In the case of the DG, as mentioned earlier, either
egalitarianism or altruism can trigger generous offers, whereas
zero offers may be the result of either selfishness or spitefulness.
Something similar happens to the UG responder: a high MAO
can be the result of either egalitarianism or spitefulness (Brañas-
Garza et al., 2014) while a low MAO could arise from either selfish
or, especially when MAO is set to zero (Staffiero et al., 2013),
altruistic considerations. In this vein, we consider that altruism
motivates those individuals who offered 10 or more out of the €20
in both the DG and the UG and who set their UG MAO to zero.
Spitefulness would lead individuals to offer zero in the DG and set
their UG MAO to the equal split (i.e., €10), whereas egalitarians
split the pie equally in both games and set their MAO to half of
the pie (Table 1; see also Brañas-Garza et al., 2014).
For UG proposers, apart from the above motives that may
underlie DG giving as well, generous offers can also emanate from
efficiency concerns and from strategic self-interest, both motives
grounded in the avoidance of rejection. Given that a rejection
destroys the pie, an individual motivated by efficiency should
leave at least some “margin for agreement” between what she
offers and what she demands in order to avoid rejections (Espín
et al., 2015). Thus, we will characterize as efficiency concerned
those individuals whose offer in the UG exceeded their own
MAO. On the other hand, a straightforward measure of strategic
TABLE 1 | Behavioral motive profiles.
Motive Description (out of a pie of €20)
Altruism (DG offer & UG offer ≥ 10) & (UG MAO = 0)
Spitefulness (DG offer = 0) & (UG MAO = 10)
Egalitarianism (DG offer & UG offer = 10) & (UG MAO = 10)
Efficiency (UG offer > UG MAO)
Strategic self-interest (UG offer > DG offer) & (UG offer < 20)
Narrow selfishness (DG offer = 0) & (UG MAO ≤ 2)
behavior can be obtained by comparing the same participant’s
offers in the DG and the UG (Steinbeis et al., 2012; Exadaktylos
et al., 2013): we will consider that an individual is motivated by
strategic self-interest if her offer in the UG is strictly higher than
her offer in the DG (but excluding those individuals who offered
the whole pie in the UG as they cannot have increased their offer
from the DG to the UG out of self-interest; see Table 1). Finally,
(narrowly) selfish individuals would offer zero in the DG and set
their UG MAO either to zero or to the lowest positive amount (in
our case, €2; these are the choices predicted by the self-interest
model, see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Staffiero et al., 2013).
In A1, we show the proportion of subjects that can be classified
according to each of these definitions. It is interesting to see
that less than 4% of them displayed pure selfishness across games
(a similarly low proportion has been found for instance in
Yamagishi et al., 2014), whereas almost one half left some margin
for agreement in the UG in order to avoid reducing efficiency
through rejection. A similar proportion of all subjects can be
classified as being motivated by altruism and spitefulness (about
8%), and by egalitarian and strategic concerns (roughly 30%).
Statistical Analysis
For the statistical analysis we employed Stata 13 software. We
use a multinomial logistic regression model where the categorical
dependent variable describes in which group each participant was
classified according to his/her decisions in the two roles of TG
(as shown in Figure 1B). This allows us to explore the factors
that impact relatively more on one TG strategy compared to the
others. Regression analysis also permits us to control for a set of
demographics and possible confounds.
The “Results” Section is divided in two parts. We first analyze
the TG strategies as a function of the raw game measures (DG
offer, UG offer, and UG MAO). Although these relationships
have been studied before (e.g., Ashraf et al., 2006; Chaudhuri
and Gangadharan, 2007; Yamagishi et al., 2012), the analyses
so far have studied either the trustor’s or trustee’s decisions
separately. In the first subsection, we contribute to this literature
by considering both roles simultaneously.
In the second subsection, we employ the social motives
(Table 1) as explanatory variables. Note that not all motives are
mutually exclusive. The social motives that are independent to
each other by definition are altruistic, spiteful, egalitarian, and
selfish, on the one hand, and egalitarian and strategic on the
other. The inclusion of all variables in the regression at the same
time serves to investigate the relative incidence of each motive,
controlling for the impact of the others that are not mutually
exclusive. Although we have used definitions based on previous
literature, as mentioned, these can be contested as there could be
other ways to define the motives. However, we consider that our
methodology is appropriate. Take the example of strategic self-
interest and efficiency definitions. It could be argued that selfishly
strategic individuals may have UG offer>UG MAO, which is the
condition we imposed to define efficiency considerations (see also
Espín et al., 2015). Indeed, 55% of those participants classified as
strategic according to our definition, also belong to the efficiency
category. Yet, note that this emanates from their high UG offer
rather than their low MAO, since the latter does not reflect
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strategic behavior of a self-interested individual (i.e., low MAO
is a condition for narrow, not strategic self-interest). Thus, we
consider that strategic self-interest is more accurately defined
by the difference between UG offer and DG offer (Steinbeis
et al., 2012; Exadaktylos et al., 2013). Therefore, since we include
all motives together in the regressions, any significant effect of
efficiency is not due to strategic self-interest because the possible
overlap is accounted for.
RESULTS
Game Decisions
In Figure 2, we show for each of the four TG groups the mean
values (in €) of the raw measures obtained from the DG and the
UG, that is, DG offer (Figure 2A), UG offer (Figure 2B) and UG
MAO (Figure 2C). In order to compare the relative incidence of
each measure across TG groups, we performed a multinomial
logit regression model (robust standard errors clustered on
interviewers), the results of which are summarized in Figure 3.
In the regression, we controlled for a number of basic variables
and possible confounds including gender, age, educational level,
household income, cognitive skills, and risk preferences (risk
preferences were elicited using hypothetical monetary incentives;
see Appendix for a description of each variable). In Figure 3, we
set up group YY (Trustful & Trustworthy) as the comparison
category. Complete regressions comparing all groups, with and
without controls are presented in Appendix Table A2.
It can be seen from Figure 2 that group YY captures those
subjects with the highest mean DG (8.87 out 20) and UG offers
(9.81 out of 20) whereas the lowest mean values of these two
variables (5.51 and 7.84, respectively) are observed in group NN
(Not Trustful & Not Trustworthy). In the case of UG MAO
the picture changes considerably since it is groups YY and YN
(Trustful & Not Trustworthy) that comprise the lowest (6.77 out
of 10) and highest (7.76) mean values, respectively.
The results of the regression model confirm these observations
(Figure 3). In particular, the differences between groups YY and
NN in terms of DG and UG offers are significant (p < 0.01
and p = 0.02, respectively). This suggests a possible impact
of altruistic and/or egalitarian considerations. The difference
in UG MAO between groups YY and YN is also significant
(p < 0.01). Some intermediate comparisons reach significance
as well (see Appendix Table A2). The case of group YN seems
FIGURE 2 | Mean DG and UG behavior across TG groups. (A–C) Refer to DG offer, UG offer, and UG MAO, respectively. As can be seen in Figure 1B, the
number of observations in each group are 439 in YY, 108 in YN, 112 in NY, and 115 in NN.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 May 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 728
fpsyg-07-00728 May 13, 2016 Time: 15:0 # 7
Espín et al. Heterogeneous Motives in Trust Game
FIGURE 3 | TG outcomes as a function of DG and UG behavior.
Multinomial logit output. A positive (negative) coefficient means that individuals
with a higher (lower) value of that specific variable (i.e., DG offer, UG offer, or
UG MAO) are more likely to be included in that specific group (i.e., YN, NY, or
NN) compared to group YY. Controls are: gender, age, household income,
educational level, cognitive skills, risk preferences, and order effects.
Complete regressions comparing all groups as well as regressions without
controls can be found in Appendix Table A2. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
particularly interesting for two reasons: on the one hand,
individuals belonging to this group offer relatively little in the
DG but have the highest MAO, which could be an indication
of either spitefulness or lack of altruism; on the other hand,
compared with group YY, their UG offer is not as low as their
DG offer, which could be an indication of strategic self-interest.
Lastly, the fact that the highest UG offer and the lowest MAO
are observed in group YY suggests that efficiency concerns may
be important for individuals belonging to this group. Our next
analysis addresses these issues by studying the relative incidence
of the above-defined motive profiles on each TG group.
Social Motives
In Figure 4, we display the proportion of subjects that can be
classified according to each of the six motive profiles obtained
from DG/UG behavior, broken down by TG groups, as before.
Figures 4A–F refer to altruism, spitefulness, egalitarianism,
efficiency, strategic self-interest, and narrow selfishness,
respectively. To statistically test the differences between TG
groups, we again performed a multinomial logit regression
model, which is summarized in Figure 5. Complete regressions
comparing all groups, with and without controls are presented in
Appendix Table A3.
With regards to altruism, Figure 4A shows that the highest
percentage of subjects (12.30%) is concentrated in group YY,
while the lowest incidence of altruism is observed in group
YN (2.78%) closely followed by group NN (3.48%). However,
the difference between groups YY and YN is only close to
significance according to the regression results (p = 0.12;
Figure 5). The only difference with respect to group YY that
reaches (marginal) significance is that of group NN (p = 0.06),
which is the strongest difference (i.e., it is associated with the
highest absolute coefficient) in the regression output. Turning
to spitefulness (Figure 4B), the highest incidence is observed in
group NN (19.13%) while the lowest is observed in group YY
(2.96%). This difference is indeed significant according to the
regression (p< 0.01; Figure 5). These results seem to suggest that
altruism is positively related with both trust (especially among
trustworthy individuals) and trustworthiness (especially among
FIGURE 4 | Incidence of each motive profile across TG groups. (A–F) Refer to altruism, spitefulness, egalitarianism, efficiency, strategic self-interest, and
narrow selfishness, respectively. The percentages provided refer to the proportion of subjects within each group which can be classified according to each motive
type. As can be seen in Figure 1B, the number of observations in each group are 439 in YY, 108 in YN, 112 in NY, and 115 in NN.
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FIGURE 5 | TG outcomes as a function of motive profiles. Multinomial
logit output. A positive (negative) coefficient means that individuals with a
higher (lower) value of that specific variable (i.e., the motive profile) are more
likely to be included in that specific group (i.e., YN, NY, or NN) compared to
group YY. Controls are: gender, age, household income, educational level,
cognitive skills, risk preferences, and order effects. Complete regressions
comparing all groups as well as regressions without controls can be found in
Appendix Table A3. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
trustful individuals) whereas spitefulness is negatively related
with both, although more with trustworthiness.
When it comes to egalitarianism, Figure 4C shows that, while
group YY has the highest incidence (31.66%), groups YY and
NY comprise an almost identical proportion of subjects, as it
happens with groups YN and NN, although the lowest incidence
is observed in the former (17.59%). This symmetry indicates
that egalitarian considerations only matter for trustworthy but
not for trusting behavior. Indeed, only groups YN and NN are
significantly different from group YY in terms of egalitarianism
(p = 0.03 and p = 0.05, respectively; Figure 5). In the case of
efficiency (Figure 4D), the highest difference is again observed
between groups YY (51.25%) and YN (38.89%). Remarkably,
groups NY and NN (both below 42%) comprise a very similar
percentage of efficiency concerned individuals as group YN,
and much lower than that in group YY. The regression results
confirm these observations as the incidence of efficiency concerns
is significantly lower in group YN (p = 0.03), and marginally
significantly lower in groups NY and NN (both p = 0.08),
compared to group YY (Figure 5). Thus, efficiency seems to be
a concern for trust only among trustworthy individuals.
We now turn to self-interest. It can be seen from Figure 4E
that strategic considerations are particularly prominent among
individuals included in group YN (49.07%) while they are
relatively more absent among those included in group YY
(23.92%). This difference is significant according to our
regression model (p = 0.02; Figure 5). Thus, strategic
considerations are apparently relevant for trust only among
those individuals who are not trustworthy as trustees (indeed,
the difference between trustful and not trustful individuals
among those who are trustworthy, i.e., groups YY and NY,
is insignificant, p > 0.9). Lastly, with regards to the small
percentage of subjects who can be classified as narrowly selfish, the
incidence ranges from 1.82% in group YY to 7.14% in group NY
(Figure 4F). Yet the proportions in groups YN and NN are nearly
identical to those in groups YY and NY, respectively. According
to the regression model, in fact, only groups NY and NN differ
significantly from group YY (p < 0.01 and p= 0.01, respectively;
Figure 5). This finding suggests that narrow self-interest only
matters for trust but not for trustworthy behavior, although due
to the low incidence of narrow selfishness we interpret this result
with caution.
DISCUSSION
The paper presents a rich behavioral dataset from a large
representative sample. The results reveal that our understanding
of individuals’ behavior in the Trust Game can be largely
benefited by having subjects play both roles in the game. One
of the most striking results that emerged from the analysis is
the considerable differences observed within trustful individuals:
individuals who are both trustful and trustworthy (group YY)
differ remarkably from those trustful individuals who are not
trustworthy (group YN). Trust in the former group seems to
be driven more by efficiency concerns and less by strategic
considerations than the latter. What is more, the motivational
gap between these two trypes of trustful individuals (YY vs.
YN) seems to be more pronounced than that between group
YY and group NY (not trustful but trustworthy individuals). In
fact, regarding efficiency and especially strategic considerations –
but not regarding altruism and spitefulness – the difference of
YY with YN is even larger than with NN (not trustful and not
trustworthy). Note also that among untrustful individuals the
differences are much less pronounced (in fact groups NY and NN
only differ significantly regarding one of the six motives under
study: spitefulness impacts more on the latter; see Appendix
Table A3). Interestingly, the only motive that is clearly related
just to one single role is egalitarianism, which impacts on
trustworthiness but not on trust.
This apparent distinction between trustful individuals of the
YY and YN groups is particularly important given that the
latter constitute a non-negligible 20% of all trustful individuals
and might have serious implications for the way we interprete
previous results. Consider for instance the case of the beneficial
effects of trust at a macro level. The main theories regarding
the causal mechanisms underlying these effects emphasize the
“lubrication” of market interactions (Guiso et al., 2006, 2008,
2009) and the facilitation of group cooperation (Balliet and Van
Lange, 2013a; Van Lange et al., 2013) and of norm-enforcement
institutions (Balliet and Van Lange, 2013b). It would go a long
way in either validating or discrediting each of these theories if
we could know whether different trusting types are responsible
for different processes. That is, are trusting individuals of one
specific type more likely to be the catalysts of the cooperation-
enhancing effects of trust? The answer is not obvious. It might be
that these effects can be traced back solely to trustful individuals
of the YY group because of their efficiency concerns. However, it
might also be that the more strategic trustful individuals of the
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YN group are more responsive to the threat of sanctions and
thus they increase cooperation to a larger extent when norm-
enforcement institutions are at play. Analyzing these processes
is an interesting endeavor for future research.
From an applied point of view, these results may also have
interesting implications at a more micro level. Working teams
could be organized in such a way so that those individuals
who trust out of efficiency concerns are matched with those
who are less trustworthy because the former will probably
still cooperate with the latter in order to increase the team’s
efficiency. Recall here that there is a considerable fraction of
individuals who decide to trust even if they believe that their
trust will not be reciprocated (Ashraf et al., 2006; Fetchenhauer
and Dunning, 2009; Dunning et al., 2014). On the other
hand, individuals who trust mainly due to strategic self-
interest should be matched with trustworthy individuals since
otherwise cooperation would likely collapse. Further research is
needed on the interaction between trusting types and teamwork
performance.
The present study also reveals that we might actually be
able to distinguish between efficiency concerned and strategic
trustful individuals by observing their behavior as trustees in
the TG. Adding the trustee’s decision task to the research design
might thus be a relatively inexpensive way of gaining potentially
very valuable information. This is especially relevant since over
the last years the TG is being used in many field studies
(Barr, 2003; Schechter, 2007; Cárdenas and Carpenter, 2008;
Johansson-Stenman et al., 2013) and is becoming increasingly
embedded in large-scale surveys (Fehr et al., 2003; Bellemare
and Kröger, 2007; Ermisch et al., 2009; Sapienza et al.,
2013; Naef et al., 2014), substituting the the so-called trust-
question.3
Lastly, these findings add to a growing literature challenging
the traditional, often unidimensional interpretation of behavior
in economic games, such as punishment in the Public Goods
and Ultimatum Games and giving in the Dictator Game (Gächter
and Herrmann, 2009; Espín et al., 2012; Yamagishi et al., 2012;
Staffiero et al., 2013; Brañas-Garza et al., 2014).
A word of caution, however, is in order here. In this
paper, we have analyzed the relative importance of different
social motives for game play behavior in the TG. However,
the aggregate incidence of these motives may change along
with the change in expectations, for instance cross-culturally.
3 The question included in many surveys such as the General Social Survey and
the World Values Survey reads as follows: “Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”.
Apart from issues of incentive incompatibility, and the vagueness in interpreting
“trust”, there have been concerns regarding what the question actually measures
(see Sapienza et al., 2013). Mirroring the traditional view of trust, the question
indeed elicits the respondent’s expected trustworthiness about most people, rather
than the respondent’s trust attitudes (in which case the wording would have been
closer to “Do you trust most people?”). Therefore the cross-cultural evidence of the
correlates of trust with economic and social indexes may in fact reflect something
different than previously interpreted.
That is, the expected behavior of the trustee may affect the
importance of altruism, egalitarianism, and strategic self-interest
for trusting behavior.
Apart from beliefs (and relatedly uncertainty), other motives
might be at play at the same time. Indeed, some people
might trust or be trustworthy just for the sake of trusting or
being trustworthy. For example, Dunning et al. (2014) in a
series of experiments provide evidence that trusting behavior
follows the logic of social norms (that is, they are decisions
one should make regardless of the material consequences; see,
however, Bicchieri et al., 2011, suggesting that trustworthiness
but not trusting behavior is a social norm). There is also
plenty of evidence that immediate or anticipated emotions,
such as shame, embarrassment, and excitement, may be driving
trusting and trustworthy behavior in the TG as well (Loewenstein
et al., 2001; Dunning et al., 2012; Schlösser et al., 2015).
Additionally, a desire to signal (either to oneself or to others)
that one is a good person, may also lead people to trust or
to be trustworthy (Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Dunning, 2007;
Barkan et al., 2015). Positive reciprocity, which falls outside
the distributional social preferences analyzed here, is of course
another important motive driving trustworthiness. Lastly, from
a more methodological point of view, regarding our empirical
strategy, one might argue that people are not using consistent
strategies across games (as we essentially assume; Yamagishi
et al., 2013) but are instead switching strategies across games
following for instance moral licensing patterns (Monin and
Miller, 2001).
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